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Reform of the multilateral trade regime is not simply a second order problem within a wider
economic crisis. The completion of the Doha Round may be a second order question but the global
trade regime faces a series of broader systemic challenges beyond the completion of the current
negotiations. This paper identifies five challenges: (i) a marked reduction in popular support for
open markets in major OECD countries; (ii) the stalling of a transition from one global economic
equilibrium to another; (iii) a lack of clarity and agreement on the agenda and objectives for the
WTO as we move deeper into the 21st century; (iv) the demand for fairness and justice in the
governance of the WTO—the ‘legitimacy’ question and (v) the rise of regional preferentialism as
a challenge to multilateralism. Failure to address these challenges will represent not only a funda-
mental question for the future of the WTO as the guarantor of the norms and rules of the global
trade regime specifically, but also the ability to establish greater coherence in global economic
governance overall when its need is arguably greater than at any time since the depression years
of the 20th century inter-war period.
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How we might ‘govern’ the global economy is a question that has gained 
increasing importance for the scholar of political science and international 
relations over the last decade or so.  It is also now a singular question for the 
policy maker. Its salience has grown rapidly as the implications of our inability to 
provide for stable global economic management has been starkly revealed by the 
propensity for volatility and  recurrent crisis in the global economy in latter part 
of the 20th century and the early years of the 21st. The period since 2007 in 
particular has seen an unprecedented series of challenges.  The financial crisis 
resulting from the collapse of the US sub-prime mortgage market and the shocks 
that reverberated beyond the US confirmed the irrevocable interdependence of the 
global marketplace.   
The sub-prime crisis demonstrated that unchecked and under-regulated 
markets are susceptible to corporate greed, inadequate risk management, and 
subsequent loss of confidence requiring of regulatory response; albeit of an often 
ill-defined nature and contested nature. For example, the seemingly co-ordinated 
action taken by the US Federal Reserve and other central banks around the world 
and the initiatives emanating from the G20 meetings of November 2008 and April 
2009 have shown the limits of the system to regulate itself and reminded us that 
states, for all their limitations, remain the ultimate guarantors of economic 
stability and security. The case has never been clearer, since the end of the Cold 
War and the dramatic expansion of globalization, that some degree of institutional 
control is a necessary prerequisite for stability and rational management across 
the individual domains of the global economy.  The extant institutions need to 
show greater coherence and enhance, or indeed develop, legitimacy in the eyes of 
both ordinary people and national governments.   
Any reform process must also take into account the shifting balance of 
political power that is accompanying the shifting balance of economic power in 
the contemporary global order.  A characteristic (perhaps the most dramatic) of 
the last decade has been the increasing role played by the large developing 
countries as both economic and diplomatic-cum-political actors.  China’s role as 
an increasingly powerful economic actor over the last decade is well chronicled 
and is not discussed in this paper.  India’s role as a political actor, especially in 
global trade negotiations since the turn of the century, has also grown 
substantially but is perhaps less well understood. Its leadership of the emerging 
coalitions of developing countries within the context of the multilateral 
negotiations in the Doha Round is an important phenomenon in international 
economic diplomacy—in both material and theoretical terms—and is, given its 
relevance for our discussion of the WTO, afforded some attention in this paper. It 
is no exaggeration to suggest that India has come to occupy a pivotal position as a 
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‘veto player’ in multilateral global trade negotiations; a position only ever 
previously held by the US and the other major developed powers such as the EU 
and Japan.  Any conclusion of the Doha Round will need an accommodation to 
the interests of India as much as to that of the major developed actors in the 
negotiations. 
The fate of the Doha negotiations, and the role of the WTO as an 
institution more generally, is inextricably linked to recent events in the global 
financial system.  While this paper does not de-link the trade regime and the 
financial system it does focus on the position and role of the WTO as an 
instrument of policy coordination in a system under strain. In so doing it stresses 
that the future of the trade regimes it is not merely a ‘second order’ problem in a 
wider crisis.  It is a major systemic problem in its own right. It exists in 
conjunction with, not independently of, the problems of governing and regulating 
the global financial system. The difficulties with concluding the Round, also 
known as Doha Development Agenda (DDA), demonstrate not only the 
difficulties of conducting multilateral trade negotiations in the 21st century.  More 
widely, an ability (or not) to conclude the DDA also acts an important pointer to 
the prospects (or lack of them) of securing substantial institutional reform and 
enhanced cooperation in other global issue areas such as finance and the 
environment.  In short an ability, or failure, to conclude the DDA is a litmus test 
for the prospects of enhanced global economic cooperation more generally. 
These linkages are crucial to any discussion of global economic 
governance writ large.  The direct focus of this paper, however, are three serious 
questions that confront the contemporary architecture of trade governance: (i) 
How to combat the rise of bilateral and regional preferentialism in trade? (ii) How 
to determine the boundaries of the activities of the WTO as an institution? (iii) 
How to enhance justice and fairness in the deliberative processes of the WTO? 
All three were growing in salience prior to the financial crises since 2007 and all 
three have taken a back seat in the debate of global economic cooperation as it has 
developed in the wake of the financial crises of 2007. 
These three questions—appropriately contextualized—are the focus of this 
paper.  The paper argues that if seen as systemic problems, their resolution is not 
to be found in by-passing or jettisoning the WTO, as has been argued for some 
time across the political spectrum (from economic nationalists to radical de-
globalizers). The paper resists these positions notwithstanding the increasing call 
for alternative actions beyond the WTO since last abortive, Geneva mini-
ministerial of July 2008 and the growing economically nationalist/protectionist 
responses to the financial crisis since that time.  Instead the paper makes the 
judgment that these immediate trends, disturbing as they might be, do not presage 
a likely breakdown of continued trade liberalization.  Rather, the paper addresses 
what we might call the wider systemic implications for the multilateral trade 
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system before thinking about what future regulatory role the WTO might play in 
it.  
Even had a major negotiating break-through come to pass in Geneva in 
July 2008 and the financial crisis had not occurred, it remains clear that the global 
trade regime still needs to be reformed if it is to meet the aspirations of the global 
economy and to see off the challenges it faces.  The future of the WTO demands 
that we also begin to think about longer term structural issues, not simply the 
conclusion of a specific round of multilateral trade negotiations. The two issues 
are not, of course, discrete.  Any discussions about how to improve the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the WTO as an agenda-setting and decision-
making body inevitably needs to address the relationship between the wider 
‘consensus problem’ and its specific ability to ‘negotiate liberalization’.  In this 
context, the paper assumes that we should expect to see both continuity and 
considerable change in the politico-economic characteristics and institutional 
structures of the global trade regime over the coming decades.  
This paper unfolds in five sections.  Section one identifies the broader 
global, politico-economic context in which any understanding of the 
contemporary trade system is embedded.  Section two provides an overview of 
five major challenges facing the global trade regime in the opening decade of the 
21st century.  They are reflective not only of the failure to secure the DDA but 
also of wider systemic challenges for the trade regime.  Sections three to five look 
in a little more detail at three of these challenges: (i) the shifting politico-
economic landscape and the absence of leadership in the agenda setting process in 
the global trade regime; (ii) the need for greater institutional coherence in the 
relationship between trade and development and (iii) the challenge to the 
multilateral trade regime arising from the rise of preferentialism at the regional 
level. 
 
1. Global Trade in Context  
 
The triumph of market capitalism in the Cold War provided the opportunity for 
the achievement of the historic goal of free trade. Between 1947 and 1994, the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) oversaw significant reductions 
in tariffs imposed by Western European and North American nations on imported 
goods, which have fallen dramatically to average rates of 4% today. The collapse 
of the USSR allowed the US and its allies to determine the future shape of the 
global economy. Market capitalism took on a truly global character as the barriers 
to the movement of capital and goods tumbled (Bhagwati, 2004; Wolf, 2004). 
The new dispensation, which included promises of access to the markets 
of the developed world for developing countries, still worked to the benefit of the 
powerful countries that had dominated the GATT. The emergence of the Asian 
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NICs, and latterly and most dramatically China, provided the industrialized 
nations with cheap manufactures and primary products while the major economies 
gained access to new markets for their services and high-value exports. To be 
sure, this new arrangement improved the lot of many people in the developing 
world but this was not (yet at least) at the expense of the political domination of 
the global economy by the rich countries of North America and Europe. 
The new, globalised economy in the first wave of globalization was, in 
some ways, no different from the series of national and regional economies it had 
succeeded. The western tradition of limited oversight meant that few checks were 
put in place to control the corporations and individuals who ran, and profited 
from, the new global marketplace. Over time the role of the international 
institutions changed.  While the International Monetary Fund lost its initial 
mission without fully securing a new role, the World Bank has probably adjusted 
better to the changing global economic environment; securing a more ‘knowledge 
driven’ role for itself (Stone, 2003). More promisingly, the WTO emerged out of 
the GATT with a mandate to extend and embed the global marketplace, not least 
through the integration of developing countries (see Narlkar, 2005 for a basic 
introduction).  
In the initial years following the end of the Cold War the system appeared 
to work well enough. In the industrialized world, corporations took advantage of 
the new sources of cheap labor in Asia (and increasingly Eastern Europe) to 
produce cheap consumer goods and high profits. The financial titans enjoyed a 
bonanza as new markets opened up, as new ways of making profits were 
discovered and as cheap credit fuelled the consumer boom which sustained 
western economies. Even the workforces in the industrialized countries benefited 
as real incomes rose and the transition from manufacturing to services-based 
economies took hold. True, there was resistance to change in some quarters but, 
by and large, workers saw their standards of living rise. 
Economic growth in the ‘West’ assisted in the emergence of new powerful 
economies in the South and East. Most obviously, the rapidly developing state-
controlled capitalism of the Peoples’ Republic of China fed the West with 
consumer goods while lifting 400 million people out of poverty (Lawrence, n.d. 
and Breslin, 2008).  India, although it has not accepted the disciplines of the open 
market as willingly as China, has become a provider of technology-based and 
business services (Basu, et al. 2005 and Panagirya, 2008). Albeit with lesser 
global impact, Brazil’s position as a powerful agricultural and commodity trader 
has consolidated. 
However, the new dispensation has not been without its problems. 
Arguably, it replicates some of the ‘boom and bust’ features of the old national 
capitalist systems, at times on a grander scale. The first post Cold War shock to 
the system came with the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98 when the economies 
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of Southeast Asia failed to cope, amongst other things, with the demands of 
rapidly liberalizing capital market, the impact of new technology, and inadequate 
institutional structures to ensure the proper management of those markets. The 
crisis exposed the gap between market perceptions of the strength of the national 
economies and the reality that they were less robust political economies than 
analysts thought.  
2000-01 saw the Dotcom collapse. Mainly, but not exclusively an 
industrialized economy phenomenon, it followed a lengthy period of hype 
surrounding the potential inherent in the Internet and personal computing 
revolution. Between 1995 and 2000, a period of irrational exuberance (Schiller, 
2000), a speculative bubble built around Internet-based companies, appeared to 
defy the normal business models merely by increasing market share. With excess 
funds sloshing around in the world’s financial markets, speculators piled into 
these companies until reason was re-established and stock values were corrected 
with wholesale bankruptcy ensuing. The consequence was a mild but lengthy 
recession in the developed world. 
Although its full scale is not yet known, the current collapse in the 
financial system appears to be the most far-reaching of them all. Some 
commentators, pace George Soros, argue that it will prove to be the most serious 
economic crisis since the Second World War, possibly since the 1930s, and 
threatens the globalization project itself. Born in the US, out of a further bout of 
irrational exuberance (Schiller, 2008) the crisis has the potential to destabilize the 
whole global economy and has brought home the consequence of the under-
regulation of the financial sector. Without close supervision, the banks and other 
institutions of the financial system devised ever more arcane ways of 
manufacturing profits to line the pockets of their executives. As we have seen, the 
collapse in the market for ‘sub-prime’ mortgages exposed the fragility of 
confidence in the system as banks stopped lending to each other.  Bankers ran to 
regulators to secure protection from the outcomes of their own folly; an inevitable 
consequence of which has been a trend towards re-regulation of some of the 
activities of financial markets.  These events lead students of global economic 
governance to examine the prospects of cooperative global financial regulation in 
same context as the inability of the principal actors in the global trade system to 
bring about a conclusion to the DDA.  Both are political questions of ‘will’ and 
leadership. 
The international trade regime is clearly be affected by the fallout from the 
current wider economic and financial turmoil.  As part of the project to create a 
global economy, the multilateral trade system is threatened by the perception that 
globalization has been tarnished by speculative investment and other excesses in 
financial markets seeking ever larger profits at the expense of sound business 
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practice.   The spill over into the growing opposition to trade liberalization might 
be irrational, but as later sections of the paper argue, it is nevertheless real. 
At a specific level, whilst most members of the WTO appeared to have 
kept the worst domestic protectionist pressures under control in the early parts of 
the financial crisis (see WTO, 2009) there was evidence of countries adopting 
trade restricting or trade distorting measures to protect key national businesses 
and jobs. Examples of protectionist trade policy measures included increased 
tariffs on a range of products (steel, toys, apparel, footwear, food, and beverages), 
the introduction of export subsidies, increased VAT, and support to domestic 
automobile manufactures.  These activities took place across a range of countries 
including the US, the EU, China, Russia, India, Indonesia, and Mercosur. The 
effect of this was to provoke retaliation. But the risk exists. It thus becomes all the 
more important for the WTO to reach agreement on Doha.  The financial crisis 
also inhibited trade expansion through the negative effects of reduced liquidity on 
access to and sharp increases in the cost of trade credit for exporters.  This was 
particularly acute for developing country exporters.  The cost of trade credit 
tripled in some countries throughout 2008-9 (WTO, 2009: 7). 
Of course, the international trade system faces other longer standing 
systemic challenges other than the financial crisis of 2007-9.  It is clear that the 
multilateral trade system has had a positive impact on economic growth generally.  
The opening of markets does result in a more efficient allocation of resources 
worldwide. However, the overall sustainability of purely market-driven growth in 
the face of dramatic population growth and environmental degradation involving 
climate change and raw material consumption increasingly raises questions of 
global concern.  
There is now near universal agreement that greenhouse gas emissions are 
causing global warming.  More contentious, of course, is the question of how to 
reduce emissions in a way that is perceived to be fair. Of prime concern is the fact 
that historical responsibility for the emissions lies mainly with developed 
countries, which remain dependent on carbon-based fuel sources, while 
developing countries have only one realistic option if they are to pursue 
affordable development strategies and that is fossil fuel-based. Efforts to forge an 
acceptable international framework that reduces emissions in the face of 
competing demands from the developing world have not been successful and 
short run prospects are not good.  The Kyoto Protocols were rejected by the US, 
the world’s largest polluter, and did not cover the growing economic powers, 
China and India. Negotiations on the treaty to replace the Kyoto Protocols, due to 
expire in 2012, began in December 2007 and look likely to be as, if not more, 
tortuous and politically toxic as any previous round of multilateral trade 
negotiations.  Failure to secure a conclusion to the Doha Round for Trade 
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Negotiations can only be a negative demonstration effect of global political 
leadership to act collectively. 
If there are already concerns about the sustainability of the world economy 
with a global population of 6.2 billion, then longer term the future looks bleaker 
still. The British government’s projections envisage a global population of 9.5 
billion by 2050 (The Guardian, March 7, 2008). Even at current levels of 
economic activity, and bearing in mind disparities between the developed world 
and the developing world, this prospect holds enormous implications for 
policymakers. If we have difficulty in arriving at international agreements to 
control the waste we produce now, how difficult will this issue be in the future? 
How will the globe accommodate 50% percent more consumers without reducing 
per capita consumption or increasing production dramatically is a question that 
remains in the too hard box for analysts and practitioners alike?  
The problem becomes even more complex if the developing world 
succeeds in creating wealthier societies through greater integration into the world 
economy, a key objective of the multilateral trade system.  Even if the 2.5 billion 
people of China and India do not attain levels of wealth and consumption seen in 
the developed world, any significant economic development will mean increased 
pressure on resources. The possible impact of such development can already be 
seen in the rising prices of oil and foodstuffs. Over time similar effects can expect 
to be seen in relation to other primary products, especially precious metals. 
Pressure on resources and population growth pose challenges for the 
continued integration of the global economy generally, and for the trading system 
particularly. Not only is the future collective management of the global economy 
crucial to the environment in which trade governance exists, but it is also true that 
the architecture of the trade regime will need to accommodate the new stresses 
placed upon it by questions of sustainability and economic development. The 
normative argument advanced in this paper is that these issues can only be tackled 
if there is greater not less, collective action in the regulation across the spectrum 
of global economic activity.  This debate is live and the jury is out.  Showpiece 
events such as the activities of an emerging G20 suggest, however, that this need 
is understood, at least in times of crisis in the financial domain, if not easily 
accepted by all parties. Whether global institutions are capable of meeting this 
challenge is, of course, arguable.  At the outset, these challenges present a 
paradoxical problem; there needs to be institutional policy coherence but there 
must also be an institutional division of labor. Specifically for the argument 
presented in this paper, trade policymakers, operating in or around the WTO, 
cannot ignore the context in which they operate; but nor can they address all these 
issues.  While the challenges are global, they represent themselves in different 
ways in different institutional form.  The next section identifies the form these 
challenges take for the governance of the global trade regime 
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2. Five Challenges Facing the International Trading System 
 
There is, since the turn of the century, some significant evidence that many of the 
lessons learned in the 20th century about the importance of multilateral institutions 
(as transaction cost-reducers, vehicles for, trust enhancement, deal making, and 
compliance enforcement) and the norms and principles that underpin them, are in 
danger of being ‘unlearned’ in the 21st century. To immediate context for this ‘un-
learning’ includes the growing anti-globalization protests that accompany 
ministerial meetings of the WTO; near permanent rumblings of discontent by 
diverse groups of countries from within the organization; and the turn to 
alternative forms of economic governance including bilateral and regional 
preferential trade agreements. Moreover, much of the trade liberalization in 
developing countries that has occurred has done so on a unilateral basis (Stern and 
Deardoff, 2006). 
A recent detailed examination the multilateral trade regime (Warwick 
Commission, 2007) identified five central challenges facing the world trading 
system and the dilemmas they pose for policymakers. Firstly, drawing on Pew 
Foundation data, the Warwick Commission noted a paradox between continued 
governmental liberalization and internationalization of their economies in major 
OECD countries on the one hand and an attendant marked reduction in popular 
support for open markets in significant sections of the populations of these 
countries on the other. Concerns about stagnant wages, job losses, growing 
income inequality, and environmental degradation have become central to the 
political debate in most industrialized countries. Trade is seen as ‘part of the 
problem,’ especially in times of recession, rather than part of the solution by some 
large sections of their communities. The Commission also noted that this 
development was, ironically, occurring at the same time as support for economic 
liberalization was growing (amongst the political and economic elites, at least) in 
many of the larger and faster-growing developing countries. 
The second challenge facing policymakers identified was, and is, the need 
to ensure that the increasingly multipolar, or even what we might call ‘non-polar’, 
nature of the global trading system does not itself become a source of stalemate 
and dysfunction. It is now well understood that a readjustment in power relations 
in the global economy is occurring; we are witnessing a messy transition from one 
global economic equilibrium to another, as new voices and centers of politico-
economic gravity emerge in the global order. In this context, careful thought and 
action is needed to ensure the sustained participation of all major groups of WTO 
Members in its activities. Specifically, collective action decision making requires 
that the fast-growing large emerging market actors, notably but not solely China 
and India, take up leadership roles in the global trading system without the 
originally dominant economic actors, the United States and the European Union, 
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do not disengage. We also need to ensure that the smallest and poorest WTO 
Members retain a valued stake in the system. This, rather than a decline in trade 
liberalization, is perhaps the most serious potential consequence of a failed DDA. 
Tackling this challenge requires a revised modus operandi across the spectrum of 
negotiations, content, and form of WTO agreements. 
The third distinct challenge facing policymakers identified by the 
Warwick Commission was/is the need to reconcile the sometimes competing 
objectives of the WTO. Accompanying their growing weight in the WTO, 
developing countries have rightly demanded that certain matters of particular 
importance to them (political as much as economic pace agriculture) be 
addressed. At the same time, many WTO members want multilateral trade rules to 
keep up with commercial developments in the world economy. As the, at times, 
bitterly contested debate over ‘Singapore Issues’ (investment, competition policy, 
government procurement, and trade facilitation) in the early years of this century 
demonstrated, the very boundaries of WTO activity are contested. This raises 
important questions about the remit of the WTO. For instance, should the WTO 
confine itself to a limited number of trade-related measures, assuming the latter 
term could be satisfactorily defined?  If so, would such a WTO retain the interest 
of all of its membership? Alternatively, should the WTO gradually become the 
locus of economic regulation in an increasingly integrated global economy? These 
questions speak to the very purpose of the WTO and practical guidelines, founded 
in existing commercial, legal and political realities, need to be reasserted, or new 
ones determined.  
The fourth challenge is the extent to which the issues of fairness and 
justice are addressed at the WTO. Decision-making processes in the WTO have 
come under scrutiny and not just for those concerned with issues of procedural 
fairness for its own sake – but because process also influences outcomes. Unfair 
processes can result in disengagement by members and a decline in the credibility 
of an organization. The WTO gathers regular and fierce criticism from non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and numerous developing country 
governments, dissatisfied with what they see as the extremely limited, or 
qualified, legitimacy present in its negotiation, decision-making, and dispute 
settlement processes. These criticisms were brought to a head at the Seattle 
Ministerial meeting in 1999. On close empirical observation of the period since 
then, it would seem that the WTO is insufficiently credited for responding to this 
challenge. It has instituted several substantial reforms, especially in the direction 
of improving internal transparency and it is difficult not to argue that it is ahead of 
other international organizations in this regard 
Nevertheless, problems persist. The WTO needs to continue its efforts to 
build a more just multilateral trade system. This is a permanent reform process.  
WTO Members need to balance the potentially competing demands of efficiency, 
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fairness, and legitimacy within the system in such a way as to keep the diverse 
membership of the WTO engaged. Fairness here typically means those procedures 
(often termed “procedural justice”) used in the negotiation and decision-making 
process. They also include issues of fair representation, fair treatment, fair play, 
and transparency (see Albin, 2008 and Higgott and Erman, 2008). 
The fifth major challenge facing the world trading system follows partly 
from the growing frustration with slow decision-making in the multilateral 
regime. As a consequence, policymakers are turning to other vehicles for trade 
reform, notably bilateral and regional trade agreements. To be sure, frustration 
with the multilateral system is not the only spur towards regional preferentialism; 
but experience shows that these alternative vehicles for reciprocal trade 
liberalization have important knock-on effects for the multilateral trading system. 
Reconciling these approaches to trade reform is less a new challenge than an 
enduring one.  
Identifying these important problems, and their potential consequences, 
currently bearing heavily upon the world trading system, is not to suggest that the 
system is irrevocably broken. Rather, it asks whether the rules, principles, and 
processes that currently underpin the multilateral trade system can address the 
five challenges identified here during the first decades of the 21st century. The 
next section identifies a number of concrete, practical, avowedly reformist rather 
than revolutionary, recommendations for considerations.   
 
3. The Shifting Politico-Economic Landscape and the Absence of Leadership 
in the Global Trade Regime 
 
Economic globalization, especially enhanced trade liberalization and financial 
deregulation, has brought national economies ever closer together. The contours 
of the global economy continue to exhibit far-reaching changes. Throughout the 
second half of the 20th century, economic clout in matters of global commerce 
was chiefly concentrated in the US, European Union, and Japan. In this new 
century, their collective economic dominance is giving way to a dispersal of 
economic power in a southerly and easterly direction as developing countries 
come to account for a growing share of global trade and investment. Such a share 
has increased by fully a quarter since early the early 1990s—up from 39 percent 
of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1990 to 49 percent in 2006. Along 
with the three traditional economic powers (and Russia), Brazil, India, and China 
have become important centers of economic and political power in the world 
economy. Together, Brazil, China, India, and Russia now account for 26.53 
percent of global GDP. Their share of global exports has risen from 4.14 percent 
in 1990 to 14.66 percent in 2006 and, on the import side, their share has risen 
from 2.75 percent to 9.59 percent over the same period.  Other larger developing 
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countries such as South Korea, Mexico, Egypt, Turkey, and most recently 
Vietnam, have had similarly impressive growth rates in recent years. Major 
developing countries have been beneficiaries of globalization and its shapers too 
(Warwick Commission, 2007: 13-21). 
Accompanying their increasing global economic importance, China, India, 
and Brazil have also become more active political and diplomatic players in many 
key international forums. More specifically, within the global trading system, 
India and Brazil have become increasingly powerful role in the negotiation 
processes, especially with the formation of the G-20 coalition in the WTO.1 The 
importance of the G-20 coalition as a stable and fairly united coalition of 
developing countries has been both symbolically and practically significant at the 
WTO. Despite the stalemate of the talks at the Cancún Ministerial Conference, 
India, China, and Brazil demonstrated an ability, and future potential, to exercise 
collective influence on the negotiations. Indeed, India and Brazil have clearly 
established themselves as what we would call ‘process drivers’ in multilateral 
trade negotiations (see Tussie, 2009). 
However, the changing role of the large developing countries has 
generated new challenges for the multilateral trade system. But within the WTO, 
the transformation of the old Quad group (Canada, the European Union, Japan, 
and the US) into the G4 (US, European Union, India and Brazil) demonstrates the 
surprising flexibility and adaptability of the system, especially when contrasted 
with the rigidity to be found at the IMF and the World Bank. But the G4 is not a 
club of like-minded countries in the way of the old Quad, and what role it might 
play in the future still remains to be seen.  
In sum, the bipolar multilateral trading system of old has given way to a 
multi-polar alternative. Moreover, large numbers of flexible, and sometimes fluid, 
coalitions of WTO Members have been formed to assert more effectively national 
commercial objectives (see Narlikar and Tussie, 2004). This has markedly added 
to the complexity of agenda formation and negotiation in the WTO and the 
consequences have so far been mixed. The greater participation of a broader range 
of WTO Members, and the vibrant deliberations that this has produced, are surely 
to be welcomed, especially at a time when disaffection with, and in some 
instances disengagement from, other international economic institutions is 
growing. Yet, at the same time, the difficulties experienced in concluding the 
DDA suggest that reaching collective accords will become increasingly, not less, 
challenging. 
 
                                                
1 To be distinguished from the G20 of the financial summits of November 2008 and April 2009.  
The WTO G20 is made up of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, 
Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South 
Africa, Tanzania, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. 
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Emerging Trade Powers and the Support for Openness in Developing Countries   
 
Even though several developing countries have simultaneously emerged as 
leading trading powers, this does not imply that the national priorities and 
challenges facing policymakers in these countries are similar or that the growth 
trajectories undertaken by them, apart from a trend to openness, are comparable. 
Degrees of openness also vary by country and sector: China, for example, has 
opened up considerably both to trade and investment while India has been more 
reticent on both counts. By opening its economy, China has already become the 
world’s third largest importer. China has accepted and implemented obligations 
that go much further than those of most developing countries. China has made 
strategic use of the multilateral trade system to advance its interests, but at the 
same time, has refrained from making any explicit attempt to change the regime.  
By contrast, and notwithstanding that it still sees itself as a country whose 
overall development challenges prevent it from more fully opening its markets to 
foreign competition, India plays an increasingly important role in the negotiation 
processes as a member of the G4. India’s economic growth, like that of China and 
many other emerging economies, has been increasing dramatically.  This must 
partly explain China’s low profile in the Doha negotiations and India’s reluctance 
to offer reciprocal concessions on what they perceive as ‘small deals’ from the US 
and European Union. The basic point is that for India and China the gains to be 
had from the liberalization on offer in the DDA are small when compared to the 
gains from their own unilateral growth trajectories and the domestic political 
mileage that is to be gained by standing firm, against the US especially, in the 
negotiations.   
China’s policies since joining the WTO have been largely supportive of a 
rules-based multilateral trading order.  It has used the Doha Round negotiations as 
a “listening and learning” exercise, but shown little interest in promoting reform 
of the WTO or multilateral trade system in general. It has certainly not taken a 
role akin to that of Brazil or India. Hence there remains a misalignment between 
the roles of China and India in the global trade system and their ability, regardless 
of desire, to shape its key institution. But it is this diffusion of global economic 
power to the major developing countries that has changed the nature of the 
political power equation in the contemporary international economic order. The 
developing majors now have a role, a veto power even, in the contemporary era 
that they did not previously possess.  The political symbolism of this should not 
be underestimated. 
This position is also not a little ironic.  In contrast to growing public fears 
about globalization in industrialized countries, many citizens in the developing 
countries and, especially, the political elites of East and South Asia, certainly 
prior to the global economic downturns since 2007, were coming to the 
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conclusion that open borders were, on balance, positive for their regions. Polling 
evidence from 2005-6 showed that 71 percent of Africans thought that 
globalization was good for their own countries. In the Asia Pacific, 52 percent of 
those surveyed had a positive perception of globalization, with only 5 percent 
viewing it as negative (2006 Gallup Poll). However, this level of support in the 
developing world for worldwide economic change has yet to manifest itself in the 
unfettered commitment towards policies aimed at strengthening the multilateral 
trade regime by the emerging players.  
 
The Waning Popularity of Globalization in Industrialized Countries  
 
By contrast, and especially since 2006, globalization has come under increasing 
criticism in the early years of the 21st century from the public in industrialized 
countries.  The same polling that showed strong support for open borders in the 
developing world also indicated that support for globalization was weak in OECD 
countries. Responding to the question about whether globalization was a good 
thing or a bad thing for one’s country, only 26 percent of North Americans 
considered it ‘a good thing’, whilst almost as many, 24 percent, thought 
globalization a ‘bad thing’. Figures for Western Europe (28 percent positive, 22 
percent negative) were similar (2006 Gallup Poll).  
Increased trade growth and trade liberalization, along with financial 
deregulation, have informed a better understanding of globalization among OECD 
publics. Evidence from opinion polls suggests that the public support for 
globalization in OECD economies grows when workers achieve higher wage 
levels and deteriorates when labor markets perform badly, when labor 
remuneration is stagnant or unemployment rising.  In the US, for decades the 
world’s strongest force for globalization, the gilded age of strong economic 
growth and ample opportunity for all Americans is widely thought to have ended. 
Although globalization is not the cause of the problems in the American 
economy, it has revealed underlying weaknesses and structural faults such as 
unprecedented levels of governmental and international debt, a deteriorating 
public education network, the ever weaker social security provision for health 
care and unemployment.  
The growing concentration of wealth and power in the financial sector and 
the subsequent crises they have generated have accompanied a perception of an 
uneven distribution gains from international trade, both within and between 
countries, that has been a major factor in the decline of political support for the 
multilateral trading regime. Trade liberalization in the past has been based on the 
assumption that benefits from trade are realized in all the countries that participate 
in the process of multilateral liberalization. Whilst it has always been clear that 
some sectors of an economy may suffer from increased foreign competition, the 
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expectation has been that national aggregate economic welfare overall would rise 
with trade liberalization. 
But today there is growing support for the view that the continuing 
division of labor brought about by the growth in the economies of major 
developing countries, such as China and India, is having negative consequences 
for the major economies, especially the US and European Union. Although 
workers still enjoy the benefits of cheap developing country, especially Chinese, 
imports, their real wages are no longer rising. In the United States between 2000 
and 2006, for example, more than 96 percent of all workers saw no increase in 
their real earnings and, in some cases, a decline. At the same time, earnings have 
risen sharply for the small elite of highly qualified people and corporate 
executives (Rothkopf, 2008). 
Over the past two decades, labor has become increasingly global. 
Population growth, and the integration of China, India, and countries from the 
former Eastern bloc into the world economy, has led to an estimated fourfold 
increase in the effective global labor force. According to the IMF, the latter could 
more than double again by 2050. The bigger labor pool is being accessed by 
industrialized countries through imports of final products, off-shoring of the 
production of intermediate including services, and immigration. This ongoing 
globalization of the labor market has drawn increasing attention from 
policymakers and the media, particularly in the industrialized economies. The 
most common concern is whether the unprecedented addition of such a large pool 
of workers from emerging markets and developing countries is adversely 
affecting compensation and employment in the industrialized economies. 
The evidence is that the share of income accruing to labor, as opposed to 
capital, in industrialized economies has fallen by about 7 percentage points on 
average since the early 1980s, with the largest drop in Europe and Japan. It is this 
type of decline that fuels concerns that globalization and two of its most important 
vectors, trade and investment liberalization, rank among the chief culprits. Yet, 
rapid technological change, that is ‘skill-biased technological change’, has had a 
larger negative impact on the share of income going to labor than the 
globalization of labor per se. Technological change is reducing the share of 
income going to unskilled labor, and growth in total real labor compensation in 
unskilled sectors has hence been sluggish. Not surprisingly, globalization tends to 
be equated with rising job insecurity, often prompting calls to halt or reconsider 
policies of engagement towards the world economy.2 
It is in this difficult political context for globalization in OECD countries, 
and perhaps most notably in the United States, that some prominent economists 
and policymakers have begun to question its ultimate benefits for the American 
                                                
2 I would like to thank Pierre Sauvé for these insights 
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economy. These are not the voices usually critical of globalization. For example, 
Nobel Laureate, Paul Samuelson (2004), questioned whether globalization would 
continue to be beneficial for all economies. Productivity gains in one country 
could, under certain circumstances, benefit just one country and hurt the others. 
Mainstream trade economists, Samuelson argues, have for too long, ignored the 
adverse effects of globalization on incomes in the United States. He challenged 
the widely held view that, overall, industrialized economies benefited from 
liberalization even if the short term effects, due to the transfer of production to 
cheaper locations, were negative.   Alan Blinder, another respected American 
economist, recently added to this debate. While acknowledging the benefits of 
free trade, he argued that America could be hit by a wave of job losses as a result 
of trade liberalization. Blinder (2007) indicated that between 22 and 29 percent of 
jobs in the United States were at risk of being lost to ‘off-shoring’ with the impact 
no longer restricted to low-skill jobs but increasingly affecting high-skill services 
such as radiology, architecture, and engineering. These themes were picked up by 
both Hillary Clinton and Barak Obama in their 2008 campaigns for the 
Democratic Presidential nomination.  
The relevance of the above insights is that they alert us to the fact that 
whilst the principles that underlie trade liberalization remain largely 
unchallenged, even in analytical circles traditionally supportive of globalization, 
they are currently undergoing a process of qualification. The standard economic 
response to this dilemma—that liberalization enhances aggregate welfare—might 
well be correct but it does not solve the political problem. It might be good 
economic theory but it is poor politics. Some objections to liberalization are 
clearly just protectionism by another name. Moreover, even where material 
compensatory mechanisms might be adequate, the destruction of domestic social 
arrangements can have deleterious outcomes of their own.  But if knee-jerk 
nationalist responses are to be avoided in the early 21st century, then public policy 
must distinguish between politically inspired protectionism and legitimate welfare 
concerns. Securing domestic political support for the continued liberalization of 
the global economy requires more than just the assertion of its economic virtue. It 
also requires political legitimacy. 
Although the distribution of income and support for trade liberalization are 
only weakly correlated, some of the legitimacy problems confronting the 
multilateral trade regime appear to result from a perception that growing income 
inequality is, in part at least, a product of trade liberalization. Evidence is 
mounting that globalization is starting to hurt skilled workers in OECD countries, 
exactly the groups that have to date been its main political supporters. Thus the 
benefits from globalization have to be distributed more equally if we are not to 
see a rise of protectionism. The challenge for policymakers is to devise new forms 
of national and international collective action relating to international commerce 
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that make it easier to secure support from the new players while at the same time 
minimizing the effects of the negative public attitudes.  
 
Justice and Fairness on the Global Trade Agenda  
 
Trade governance is neither immune, nor separate, from wider notions of fairness 
and justice in the global community. Increased attention needs to be paid to the 
way that WTO agreements and procedures affect its members, particularly the 
weakest. WTO Members need to address the relationship between current trade 
rules and fairness, justice and development. The challenge in the 21st century is 
not to protect the poorest developing countries from trade, but to enable them to 
participate in the international division of labor on more equal and successful 
terms. The reality is that, without denying the virtues of open, freer trade, many 
developing countries nowadays believe that some WTO norms and applications 
are inimical to their development. Some would argue that the system today is 
based more on assumptions of reciprocity stemming more from the theory of club 
goods than a theory of public goods predicated on non-rivalry and non-
excludability and availability to all. 
The WTO displays many of the attributes of a democratic and inclusive 
club. Its rules provide for consensus decision-making in agenda-setting and the 
results of negotiations are applied on a Most-Favored Nation (MFN) basis, thus 
ensuring that all members enjoy the same benefits. In this sense, the weakest 
WTO Members gain from being part of a rules-based organization. But the DDA 
has shown that decision-making can be paralyzed by the need to achieve 
consensus not least because processes can be held to ransom by Members which 
have no interest in the topic under consideration. Also, realpolitik dictates that 
weaker Members’ ability to use the Dispute Settlement Mechanism to seek 
redress are limited and the explosion of Preferential Trading Agreements (PTAs) 
means that weaker Members are increasingly vulnerable to being marginalized 
and losing the benefits of MFN.  
The future of the global trading system, then, depends to a large extent on 
securing a more efficient process of decision-making in the WTO.  Quicker 
decision-making is also essential to the continued relevance of the WTO-based 
governance arrangements or they will wither on the vine. With national political 
cycles of around four years and ever-shortening business cycles, the length of 
time it takes to conclude a Round is contributing to the rise of bilateralism and 
regionalism. But any new procedure would need to be not only conditional on the 
preservation of the principle of non-discrimination applying to all Members but 
also reflecting the interests of all Members.  Thus a core challenge is to shape the 
agenda in a way that both respects the interests of the entire membership while at 
the same time securing the continued commitment of all parties.   
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In pursuit of this balance, some analysts recommend that consideration be 
given to the circumstances in which a “critical mass” approach to decision-
making might apply; especially with regard to rules issues, that preserves both the 
rights and interests of smaller players while recognizing the need to address issues 
of concern to a ‘critical mass’ of WTO Members (see Warwick Commission, 
2007: 30-35 and Gallagher and Stoler, 2009).  The key implication of this 
approach is that not all Members would necessarily be expected to make 
commitments in the policy area concerned. Clearly, to the degree that this runs 
across the ‘consensus’ assumptions of WTO decision-making, this is a politically 
sensitive proposition especially for developing countries and extreme care would 
need to be taken to secure their interests in any criteria they would need to meet if 
such an approach were to be adopted—indeed it may prove to be a political bridge 
too far.  Among the criteria for considering a critical mass approach to defining 
the agenda are the need to identify a positive global welfare benefit, to protect the 
principle of non-discrimination, and explicitly controlling for any income 
distribution effects of rule-making.   But, given the difficulties faced in taking the 
WTO forward in the wake of the DDA the exploration of such an approach can 
not for long be kept off its agenda for reform. 
 
4. Trade and Development: International Institutions and Policy Coherence   
 
A challenge in the 21st century is not to protect the poorest developing countries 
from trade, but to enable them to participate in the international division of labor 
on more equal and successful terms.  What rules and procedures would enable 
these countries to secure the maximum benefit from a liberalizing trading order?  
Without nowadays denying the virtues of open, freer trade, many developing 
countries nevertheless believe that some WTO norms and applications are 
inimical to their development.  Some would argue that the system today is based 
more on assumptions of reciprocity stemming more from the theory of club goods 
than a theory of public goods predicated on non-rivalry and non-excludability and 
availability to all.  One observer captured perfectly the dilemma of seeing the 
international trade regime as a global public good and the DDA as a ‘development 
round’: 
 
The adjustment burden of new rules will mostly fall on 
developing countries, as the rules that are likely to emerge will 
reflect the status quo in industrial countries (‘best practice’) … If 
the Doha Development Agenda is to live up to its name, the fact 
that country priorities and capacities differ enormously will need 
to be addressed.  There are two basic options: shift back to a club 
approach, or pursue universal membership agreements that are 
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accompanied with more development provisions. (Hoekman, 
2005: 406) 
 
To move beyond this dichotomy, a more variegated approach comprising 
the following three elements may hold greater promise: (i) critical mass-based 
initiatives (to facilitate the provision of club goods) alluded to in the previous 
section; (ii) a richer set of S&DT provisions for developing countries than 
employed at present; and (iii) a strong commitment to Aid for Trade (AfT) 
measures that ease the implementation burdens weaker WTO members may face 
(see Warwick Commission 2007 and Evenett, 2009). For these policies to succeed 
the system of global governance going forward will depend to no small degree on 
the extent to which international institutions can work together. As the art of 
government becomes ever more complex, and the degree to which institutions in 
all walks of life need to become increasingly accountable to multiple 
stakeholders, the credibility of international institutions is much more dependent 
on the way in which they work together than was previously the case.  
In the early 21st century, enhanced policy coherence amongst the 
institutions in global economic governance is a must; not an optional extra. In 
order to illustrate the problems of institutional coherence at the global level, 
consider the position in relation to the trade and development agenda.  In the late 
20th and early 21st centuries, the Bretton Woods institutions and the WTO, as 
much by accident as design it sometimes appears, now meet on the ground of 
development. The role of the World Bank here has long been self-explanatory. 
The transformation from its role as a vehicle for European reconstruction to a 
vehicle for supporting developing countries had a natural logic to it in the era of 
decolonization; as does its more recent emphasis on ‘knowledge’ (Stone, 2001) 
and ‘governance’ in the development process (Stone 2006). The IMF, however, 
has for some considerable time been an institution in search of a new mission. Its 
desired role as the arbiter of global macroeconomic rectitude, especially in the 
developing world, had largely disappeared in the wake of its sub-optimal 
performance in the financial crises of the late 20th century only to return as an 
instrument of global financial policy in the wake of the 2007-9 crises and the 
London 2009 G20 summit. The WTO’s move into the development field in the in 
the Doha Round (identified as the ‘Doha Development Agenda’) was as much by 
accident as design, occasioned as it was by the desire to kick start the current 
round of multilateral trade negotiations.  But once having been identified as a 
development round, the rhetorical and political significance, unsurprisingly, took 
on a dynamic of its own for many developing country WTO Members. 
The international institutions, if they are to be forces for good in the 
development process, need systemic policy coherence across their domains of 
competence: between balance of payments issues and financial crises (IMF); 
18




capital flows and official assistance (World Bank-IDA), norm-building and the 
creation of rules of the game in trade (WTO). Indeed, an important aspect of the 
WTO’s mandate is to co-operate with the IMF, the World Bank and other 
multilateral institutions to achieve greater coherence in global economic policy-
making. A separate Declaration was adopted at the Marrakesh Ministerial 
Meeting in April 1994 to underscore this objective and key WTO public 
documents regularly reaffirm this priority (WTO, Annual Report, 2007: 3). 
In simple terms, organizations need to talk to each other. Institutional 
coherence is particularly important in the area of trade since many of the 
challenges of trade liberalization are to be found outside of the immediate trade 
domain. Trade requires not only good rules to help advance its promotion. It also 
needs mechanisms to address concerns of those countries not as well prepared to 
benefit from a rules-based system as the more developed countries. Developing 
countries need assistance in the creation and enhancement of mechanisms to assist 
in their turn to trade liberalization. It is here that institutional policy coherence can 
make a difference. Indeed, it becomes a, perhaps the, major test for international 
economic institutional coherence in the 21st century.  
Given expectations of increased funding, aid from industrial countries to 
developing countries needs to be channeled more effectively3. Hence the agencies 
undertaking these tasks need to be as one in their understanding of how to manage 
this resource. Agencies, donors, and client countries need to manage these 
resources coherently if we are not to see problems from increasing aid flows, such 
as exchange rate problems and other distortions in domestic economies. We need 
proper regulatory institutions to prevent corruption and ensure good governance.  
In  trade, in theory at least, the World Bank helps with the development of 
‘good governance’ practice and institution building, while the WTO uses its 
intellectual and institutional influence to call for a proper ‘aid for trade’ 
relationship and the IMF ensures macro-economic stability is not compromised. 
There is, of course, often a disjuncture between theory and practice. The WTO is 
not a development bank, an aid agency, or funding body; nor should it become 
one. Little in the WTO’s history or the expertise of its staff, let alone in the 
experience of the trade diplomats sent to represent their countries’ interests at the 
WTO, suggests that this international organization has the capacity to identify, 
design, fund, and implement development projects. Moreover, the WTO has 
enough demanding and functions to execute as it is. 
In similar vein, nor should we assume that the evolving patchwork of 
bilateral, regional, and multilateral trade-related capacity building initiatives 
pursued by national aid ministries and international organizations can meet all of 
the legitimate needs of developing countries. Neither should we assume that 
                                                
3 Note: the July 2005 Gleneagles Agreement (in theory) promised additional commitments of 
between US$25-50 billion by 2010.  
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attaining these ends can solely be a matter of implementing commitments made 
by nations at the WTO. Indeed, nowadays it is almost conventional wisdom that 
WTO Members, including developing countries, must take complementary 
measures to make the most of opportunities created by trade agreements.  
The constraints identified above pose significant challenges for the WTO 
membership and for the very reputation of the WTO; challenges which the current 
AfT initiative have brought to the fore. Calls for greater co-ordination among 
donors and providers of technical assistance, although not new, are not 
particularly surprising in this context. “Coherence” may seem an unquestionably 
desirable goal but is the AfT initiative likely to deliver it?  
For the developing countries AfT is a potentially important vehicle for 
capacity building.4 However, there are a series of questions that need to be 
addressed. These concern factors such as the adequacy of donor commitments and 
whether donor promises will be met; the degree to which AfT will reflect 
developing country, rather than donor, priorities; the coherence and co-ordination 
of AfT amongst the (six) institutions that are currently party to its administration; 
and, perhaps most importantly, developing countries are concerned lest aid for 
trade should be linked to their negotiating positions in multilateral trade 
negotiations.   
To the extent that the AfT initiative provides the impetus to eliminate 
duplications in aid programs and to meet unfulfilled needs from developing 
countries, it is clearly a good thing. However, it is unclear precisely how a non-
binding, exhortatory initiative of this type will alter the interests, incentives, and 
priorities that have generated the diverse array of trade-related aid initiatives in 
the first place. Previous attempts at co-ordination among donors have often 
yielded little and it is not apparent why matters should be any different this time 
around. Concerns are particularly heightened by the, often muted, support given 
by industrial country aid ministries to seriously funding AfT initiatives and 
associated trade-related capacity building and technical assistance. Many of them 
are solely focused on poverty reduction agendas and act as if they perceive little 
positive contribution by trade to economic development. Worse still, the 
broadening definition of what constitutes ‘aid for trade’ has enabled an increasing 
number of aid projects to be classified as trade-related, thus creating the 
impression that substantial funding is being provided. 
The wider economic and geopolitical situation raises a number of serious 
concerns about the future of the globalization project in general. The multilateral 
trade system, as a crucial element of the globalised economy, cannot operate set 
apart from these realities and is forced to accept their constraints.  Expectations 
                                                
4 My knowledge of the Aid for trade Debate is informed in large part by conversations with Simon 
Evenett. To whom thanks are extended.  The discussion here reflects a large input from him, 
without of course, holding him to account for anything said. 
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among poorer countries and civil society was raised about the potential pro-
development impact of the WTO and these expectations may not be fulfilled, not 
unlike the impact of giving the Doha Round a “development” label in the first 
instance.  In the search for coherence care needs to be taken, nevertheless, in 
deciding which institutions and policymakers are responsible for what.  The WTO 
is not responsible for meeting the aid-related promises made by individual WTO 
Members at various Ministerial Conferences and elsewhere. The WTO’s 
negotiating and juridical functions relate to creating and preserving commercial 
opportunities; not to ensuring that WTO Members exploit any opportunities that 
are created.  
 
5. The Rise of Preferential Trading Agreements.   
 
If a more responsive system of justice is a necessity for the future of the world 
trading regime, then an absolute requirement is the re-invigoration of 
multilateralism in the face of the trend towards preferentialism—a trend clearly 
boosted in times of global economic crisis. The recent trend amongst larger 
countries to go outside of the WTO to reach trade deals carries the risk of 
undermining the fabric of inclusive, fair and stable institutional arrangements that 
underpin international trade. Governments appear to be forgetting the beneficial 
lessons learned in the second half of the 20th century from the débacle of largely 
institution-free trading arrangements in the first half of the 20th century.  
In the last two decades, significant trade liberalization has been achieved 
outside the multilateral arena, with most tariff reductions coming from unilateral 
liberalization. For some, growing recourse to bilateral and regional preferential 
agreements is simply an inferior policy choice that undermines multilateralism 
and should be avoided. Yet trade governance and liberalization are not as simple 
as that. PTAs need not, in all circumstances, be counterproductive in terms of a 
wider multilateral trade agenda. Moreover, such agreements, along with regional 
activity in other economic policy domains such as monetary relations, are 
increasingly a fact of life in contemporary international political and economic 
relations and they will not simply disappear. But poorly conceived regionalism 
carries many avoidable costs and tends to penalize the weaker and smaller 
members of the trade community. Even commentators favorably disposed towards 
PTAs as a vehicle of international cooperation recognize their downside from a 
more inclusive, multilateral perspective.  
Bilateral preferential agreements often involve countries that are not 
geographically contiguous, for example those between the United States and 
certain Middle Eastern and Latin American nations. Such agreements may have 
important economic implications for at least one party, but generally they are 
strongly motivated by political and strategic considerations. To the extent that 
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such PTAs involve a large (developed) and one or more small (developing) 
countries, their global economic impact will not be very significant and one 
would need to look at more localized regional factors to understand their effects 
on third parties. 
Second, large countries entering into such arrangements sometimes apply 
a standard policy template that embodies elements going beyond WTO provisions 
(the so-called “WTO-plus” provisions), either in terms of the areas covered or the 
depth of commitments. This may be seen as strategic behavior, perhaps motivated 
more generally by foreign policy considerations as was the case in the US 
bilateral PTA initiatives with Singapore and Australia in recent years (see 
Capling, 2005).  Smaller countries may also pursue these arrangements in part for 
strategic reasons, relating both to the search for stability and certainty in their 
trade relations with major partners and perhaps to a desire to define and tie in 
domestic policies in a manner that make them harder to change (see Desker, 
2004). Developing countries may be willing to accept WTO-plus provisions in 
exchange for these perceived benefits. 
One could argue that as long as trade liberalization occurs, as it does with 
unilateral liberalization, it matters less whether it is at a bilateral, regional or 
multilateral level. In theory, preferential agreements can have significant benefits; 
for example, promoting technology and knowledge transfers, domestic reforms, 
productivity gains and improved developmental prospects. Critics of preferential 
agreements, however, would emphasize the negative effects, including the 
distortion in trade patterns between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ which undermine 
the welfare gains arising from expanded trade. Critics also stress that the trade 
distortions create incentives for inefficient resource allocation. The institutional 
dimensions of rules also matter; especially the ‘spaghetti bowl’ effect of multiple 
agreements with separate rules of origin. The operational costs of meeting 
different requirements in different countries pose a major challenge, especially for 
small- and medium-sized enterprises. PTAs with these outcomes are clearly a 
second-best option compared to a multilateral agreement at the WTO with 
uniform rules applicable to all Members.5 
In the past, unilateral liberalization and preferential agreements co-existed 
with the development of multilateralism. It has been suggested that, at least during 
the first phase of regionalism after World War II, in the 1960s, these three 
                                                
5 The critical literature on regionalism is now voluminous; see illustratively Bhagwati and 











dimensions complemented rather than competed with each other. The 1980s saw 
the launch of the Uruguay Round in 1986, major steps forward in European as 
well as North American integration as well as unilateral liberalization. With the 
completion of the Uruguay Round in 1994, we saw both a remarkable 
achievement for multilateralism and some important preferential initiatives. Thus, 
we could have assumed that there is little need to see a threat to the multilateral 
regime emerging from preferential agreements. But things have changed, since 
then there has been mounting evidence to suggest that today’s preferential 
agreements create a different environment which poses threats to the multilateral 
trading regime. 
First, the United States has actively pushed for PTAs since the turn of the 
century. The country that helped shape and underwrite the post World War II non-
discriminatory trading regime has been at the forefront of those emphasizing the 
development of PTAs in recent years. Whilst the number of PTAs between the 
United States and other countries has been somewhat limited, in part due to the 
linking of trade and security policy, the continuing push for preferential 
agreements represents a break with US policies of the past. Similarly, the 
European Union has long been actively pursuing PTAs although many of them 
have been with countries either on the European continent or with which the EU 
has enjoyed strong historical relations.  
Third, Asian countries have joined the trend. Whilst important East Asian 
countries, Japan, South Korea, and China, long refrained from negotiating 
preferential agreements these countries have been extremely actively in the push 
for PTAs since the turn of the century. Fourth, many PTAs are about much more 
than regulating trade. The United States, for example, uses a template in its PTAs 
that also has the effect of shaping domestic regulation in the partner countries. 
The consequence is the creation of parallel regulatory spheres that, at least in 
some cases, make international trade more difficult than under the umbrella of the 
WTO. A plethora of competing and overlapping norms and regulations does not 
facilitate international trade. 
Regionalism will not disappear, nor is the WTO necessarily well placed to 
achieve everything that governments seek to attain in terms of their international 
trade relations with other nations. But the explosion of regionalism in recent years 
has clearly been sub-optimal in systemic and political terms in a number of ways.  
Specifically, regionalism has diverted attention from multilateral negotiations.  
Governments may believe, or be lulled politically into the conviction, that they 
can acquire all they need by way of trade policy through regional arrangements.  
This has led to, and is likely to continue to lead to, neglect of the relative costs 
and benefits, especially over time, of regional versus multilateral approaches to 
trade relations.  The challenge, as we have been told by several scholars and 
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practitioners recently is to multilateralize regionalism (see Baldwin, 2006 and 
Baldwin, Evenett and Low, 2007). 
This is a major challenge that needs to be addressed by the global trade 
policy community. Let us not forget, that one of the reasons why half of world 
trade is still conducted on a MFN basis, notwithstanding the existence of an even 
greater number of PTAs, is that the largest trading nations have so far desisted 
from negotiating PTAs among themselves.  No such agreements exist, for 
example, among the United States, the European Union and Japan, although the 
United States and the European Union have signed a ‘Framework for Advancing 
Transatlantic Economic Integration’ in April 2007.  Relatively few agreements 
exist between the three major players and major developing countries.  None of 
the three have PTAs with China or Brazil, for example.  However, other large 
developing country traders such as South Korea and Mexico do have PTAs with 
at least one of them. 
If the WTO membership is to engage seriously in addressing what has 
clearly become a challenge to the coherence and stability of the trading system, 
the largest trading nations should be willing to underwrite the “public good” of 
non-discriminatory multilateral trade.  The Warwick Commission (2007: 53) 
suggests that the major industrial countries, being mindful of the systemic 
implications of establishing additional PTAs with other large trading countries, 
should foreswear the establishment of PTAs among themselves.  Such agreements 
would be seen by their signatories as a new template for redefining the 




Embedded in the context of  wider global economic crisis, he paper has focused 
on a number of systemic challenges to the global trade regime that transcend the 
detailed negotiating issues specific to attempts to bring the DDA to a conclusion.   
Moreover, the paper has been not only analytical; it is also highly normative.  The 
normative arguments set out in it have made the case for (i) improving the 
management of agenda-setting, decision-making and participation in the global 
trade regime; (ii) defining more tightly and precisely the relationship between 
trade and development; and (iii) understanding, and responding to, the 
increasingly complex relationship between the multilateral system and the 
growing number of preferential trade relationships.   
Support for an open, liberal trading system has been shown to be neither 
consistent nor unambiguous.   Trade liberalization may well continue even 
without a completed multilateral round.  But neither will a completed Doha speed 
up liberalization dramatically.  Nor will it prevent states from resorting to 
previously higher tariffs (see Evenett, 2009). But other linked elements have been 
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shown to be important too.  For many supporters of the WTO, especially some of 
the smaller countries whose participation in trade negotiations is unlikely to affect 
the size or shape of an agreement like the DDA, it is the other elements, 
especially principles and rules that are important. Indeed, lessons about the 
importance of rules and principles in international relations, especially with 
regards to the value of multilateralism and institutions, may be coming 
‘unlearned’ by some of the major players at exactly the a time when they are most 
needed.   Notwithstanding the efforts of the WTO and the G”) summits, the 
outbreak of financial crises in 2007 and the major economic downturn that has 
followed have seen backsliding in WTO member commitments to the multilateral 
trade regime and the growth of what two analysts call ‘murky protectionism’ 
(Baldwin and Evenett, 2009) 
We may be entering an era of what Robert Keohane (2005) has called’ 
‘contingent multilateralism’ in which the major players, and especially the 
erstwhile hegemon, sets less store by the self binding ordinances in the early 21st 
century than it did in the second half of the 20th century when the grand 
institutional bargain held (Ikenberry, 2000). In the trade domain the GATT and 
subsequently the WTO for half a century gave voice and legitimacy to these rules.  
A characteristic of the present era, not present at the time of the 1930s Depression 
has indeed been the existence of a substantive set of trade rules.   But the trade 
rules have received little or no attention in the DDA and the challenge to them in 
the recent era of financial crisis has come to be thought of as a second order 
problem in a wider reform agenda.  As Pascal Lamy has recently noted, we ignore 
their salience in mitigating crisis at our peril (Lamy, 2009: 3.).  It is the WTO’s 
role as the guardian and socializer of the norms, principles and rules of global 
trade, that is so important if we are to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past, 
especially avoiding a return to ‘beggar they neighbor’ protectionist trade policies 
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